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We introduce a relativistic version of quantum encryption protocol by considering two inertial
observers who wish to securely transmit quantum information encoded in a free scalar quantum field
state forming Minkowski particles. In a non-relativistic setting a certain amount of shared classical
resources is necessary to perfectly encrypt the state. We show that in the case of a uniformly
accelerated eavesdropper the communicating parties need to share (asymptotically in the limit of
infinite acceleration) just half of the classical resources.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Yz
Only relatively a small fraction of works on quantum information theory studies its various aspects in a relativistic
setting [1]. The violation of Bell’s inequality for a quantum entangled state shared by two observers who are not
at rest with respect to each other in special [2] or general relativity [3] attracted a bit more attention. Also, it was
observed that the entanglement is a quantity depending on a relative acceleration of one of the observers who, before
being accelerated, shared a maximally entangled bosonic [4] or fermionic pair [5]. In the latter it was found that
the entanglement does not vanish even in the limit of infinite acceleration. The physical effect behind the scene
responsible for this behavior is the Unruh effect [6] which can be generalized into an arbitrary spacetime dimension by
the thermalization theorem [13]. As a seminal example of its consequences on the effectivity of quantum information
protocols in a relativistic setting let us recall a relativistic version of the quantum teleportation protocol [7]. In
this case Alice is a stationary observer sharing a maximally entangled state with Bob in the same frame. Later, Bob
uniformly accelerates with respect to Alice and it is found that the fidelity of an input and output state is a decreasing
function of Bob’s acceleration. Due to the Unruh effect, Bob has no longer access to the maximally entangled state and
the higher acceleration he perceives the less entangled state is effectively shared by both participants. Consequently,
the reliability of the teleportation is reduced. Therefore, this quite different behavior from the ‘standard case’ leads
us to the revision of the other quantum communication protocols.
In this paper we consider relativistic effects in a cryptographic protocol known as Private Quantum Channel (PQC).
We are interested in learning how can relativistic effects be used to relax the assumptions on classical resources needed
for the perfect encryption of a quantum state. It is known that for an eavesdropping in the same frame where the
communication takes place two bits of shared classical information are necessary for the secure transmission of the
state. We have shown that the amount of the shared classical resources is reduced if the eavesdropper (Eve) is in a
relative uniform acceleration with respect to inertial Alice and Bob. In the limit of infinite acceleration, the classical
cost of the secure encryption is reduced to one half. The infinite acceleration limit corresponds to a situation in
which freely falling Alice and Bob (into a black hole) transmit information while Eve escaping the fall tries to tap the
communication. Note that in the following analysis we will encrypt qubits but our results can be directly generalized to
the case of d-level states (qudits). On the other hand, the encryption of states with infinitely many degrees of freedom
(so called continuous-variable quantum states) requires much more caution even in the non-relativistic case [9].
The structure of the paper is the following. In Sec. I we remind the concept of Minkowski (Rindler) particles
as a free massless scalar field given by the quantization of a superposition of plane waves forming wave packets in
Minkowski (Rindler) spacetime. We will employ an effect similar to the Unruh effect (derived for the single photon
field excitations), that is, a decomposition of the Minkowski one-particle state into the many-particle Rindler state
occupying two causally disconnected regions. In Sec. II we recall some of the basic properties of PQCs together
with the justification of their use. The main part comes in Sec. III where we derive an upper bound on information
which a non-inertial eavesdropper, in the limit of infinite acceleration, is able to extract from partially encrypted
communication being in progress between two legal inertial observers.
∗Electronic address: kbradler@epot.cz
2I. TRANSFORMATION OF MINKOWSKI PARTICLES INTO A NON-INERTIAL FRAME
The wave packets, whose properties will be employed, were studied in detail in [12] (and originally come from [14])
but for more general approach to the particle/wave packet concept in QFT we refer to Takagi’s noticeable earlier
paper [13]. The used wave packets have the usual form of a superposition of plane waves in both spacetimes modulated
by Fourier coefficients with a simple structure. The quantization was performed for a free massless scalar bosonic
field and the resulting objects in Minkowski spacetime are known as Minkowski particles (and similarly for Rindler
spacetime). Such an object is spatially and temporarily localized and thus allows us to talk about preparation,
manipulation and measurement as known from non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is not possible with a single
field excitation (Fock state) as understood by QFT (similar approach with a different kind of quantized wave packets
was quite recently used for predicting of a decoherence effect of an entangled pair with one of the qubits perceiving
changes in the gravitational field [15]). How could a communication with Minkowski particle look like? This is in fact
the question of the information encoding, i.e. defining a logical qubit communication basis. As we will see, the choice
of the encoding has an impact on the calculation using the field transformation from Minkowski to Rindler spacetime.
Let the Minkowski observers’ basis be composed of two one-Minkowski particles both in two orthogonal spatial
modes (here indexed as 1,2). This is known as the dual rail encoding used, for example, in linear-optical quantum
computing schemes [16] or an experimental realization of quantum teleportation protocol [17]. Then, we can write
our logical qubits as
{|O〉 ≡ |0〉
M
1
|1〉
M
2
, |1 〉 ≡ |1〉
M
1
|0〉
M
2
}, (1)
where |0〉, |1〉 is the Minkowski vacuum and the Minkowski one-particle, respectively. Similarly as for the quantization
of Fock states the field is quantized in both Minkowski and Rindler spacetime and the corresponding creation and
annihilation operators (before the quantization being the mode expansion coefficients) are defined. Using the Klein-
Gordon inner product these two sets of operators are related and the creation and annihilation operators from one
space are expressed as linear combinations of those from the other space. The coefficients in these combinations are
known as the Bogoliubov particle coefficients yielding [12] the transformed Minkowski vacuum (the Rindler vacuum)
|0〉
M
1
=
∏
k,l
1
cosh rk
∞∑
g=0
tanhg rk |g−k,l〉1L |gk,l〉1R, (2)
where cosh rk =
(
1− e−2πωkc/a
)−1/2
, tanh rk = e
−πωkc/a with a the Rindler observer’s proper acceleration and e.g.
|gk,l〉1R is the Rindler g−particle state with integer mode numbers k, l characterizing the particle in Rindler spacetime
in spatial mode 1 and the right wedge. The Minkowski one-particle state as seen by the Rindler observer has the
form [12]
∣∣1k˜l˜〉M1 = [ ∏
k 6=kt
l 6=lt
1
cosh rk
∞∑
p=0
tanhp rk |p−k,l〉1L |pk,l〉1R
]
×
1
cosh2 rkt
∞∑
q=0
√
1 + q tanhq rkt |(1 + q)−kt,lt〉1L |qkt,lt〉1R,
(3)
where the indexes with tildes indicate the particles in Minkowski space and kt, lt are so called equivalent modes in
Rindler spacetime [12] corresponding to the indexes k˜l˜. As usual, the Rindler observer has access just to one of the
wedges (in our case to the right one). Generally, we can see the glimpse of similarity to the transformation of ordinary
Fock states.
Let us see how a density matrix in the dual-rail representation transforms as a whole. Taking the corresponding
products of Eqs. (3) and (2) and tracing over the left wedge the matrix elements acquire the form of infinite-dimensional
matrices. First, for the diagonal elements we have
TrL [|O〉〈O|] =
∏
k,l
1
cosh2 rk
∞∑
g=0
tanh2g rk|gk,l〉〈gk,l|1
×
∏
k 6=kt
l 6=lt
1
cosh2 rk
∞∑
p=0
tanh2p rk|pk,l〉〈pk,l|2 ×
1
cosh4 rkt
∞∑
q=0
(1 + q) tanh2q rkt |qkt,lt〉〈qkt,lt |2, (4)
and similarly for TrL [|1 〉〈1 |]. We see that both matrices are diagonal due to the orthogonality relations valid for k, l
3and the spatial modes. After tracing over the left wedge of the transformed off-diagonal matrix elements we get
TrL [|O〉〈1 |] =
∏
k 6=kt
l 6=lt
1
cosh2 rk
∞∑
p=0
tanh2p rk|pk,l〉〈pk,l|1 ×
1
cosh3 rkt
∞∑
q=0
√
1 + q tanh2q rkt |(1 + q)kt,lt〉〈qkt,lt |1
×
∏
k 6=kt
l 6=lt
1
cosh2 rk
∞∑
f=0
tanh2f rk|fk,l〉〈fk,l|2 ×
1
cosh3 rkt
∞∑
g=0
√
1 + g tanh2g rkt |gkt,lt〉〈(1 + g)kt,lt |2
= (TrL [|1 〉〈O|])
T
. (5)
Thus, both off-diagonal elements from Minkowski spacetime become off-diagonal matrices in Rindler spacetime and
a general Minkowski density matrix (in the dual-rail representation) is symmetrical and three-diagonal after the
transformation.
II. PERFECT AND PARTIAL QUANTUM STATE ENCRYPTION
Having introduced the concept of localized objects both in Minkowski and Rindler spacetime we can start gener-
alizing PQC into the relativistic setting. Let Alice and Bob be two inertial observers in Minkowski spacetime who
share a random and private string of bits – key and are connected through a quantum channel. The bits of the key
index unitary operations (to be specified) are defined in a space spanned by the dual rail basis vectors (1). Hence,
Alice receives/prepares an arbitrary and unknown quantum state (generally a mixed state written in the dual rail
basis (1)) and applies one of the unitaries dictated by the key. She sends the modified state down the channel to Bob
who makes the inverse unitary operation. The task for Alice and Bob is to securely transmit the input (unencrypted)
state and to prevent from a potential eavesdropping by Eve. She has full access to the quantum channel and is able to
construct any generalized measurement (POVM) that could give her some information about the state. In our case,
we suppose that Eve is a non-inertial observer so let us investigate the consequences for the protocol security.
The theory of PQCs learns [8] that for any qubit Ξ holds
Ξ 7→
1
4
4∑
i=1
σiΞσ
†
i =
1
2
= ̺, (6)
where the encryption set composed of the Pauli matrices {σi}⇋ {1 , σX , σY , σZ} is the usual (but non-unique) choice
for the encryption procedure. No matter the form of Ξ someone without the knowledge which operation for the
encryption σi was used has no chance to get any information about the state since in the identity density matrix
there is no information on the input state. This is called a perfect encryption. We also see that necessary (and also
sufficient [8]) length of the shared key for the encryption of one qubit are two bits. On the other hand, if we don’t
adhere to the rule of not using less than a two-bit key and use, for instance σ1, σ2, i.e. just a one-bit key, we get a
partially encrypted qubit
Ξ 7→
1
2
2∑
j=1
σjΞσ
†
j =
1
2
(
1 f(Ξ12,Ξ21)
f(Ξ12,Ξ21) 1
)
= ˜̺. (7)
Hence, in the off-diagonal terms of ˜̺ there is some hidden information about Ξ and the state is not secured. So,
assuming the partial encryption a possible inertial eavesdropper would apparently have a chance to get some infor-
mation on the input state. But how is it with Eve as the non-inertial eavesdropper? Before answering this question
let us make a small detour and say something general about the PQC applicability.
Obviously, PQC is meaningful whenever an eavesdropper can get some information about density matrix elements by
any kind of generalized measurement. Into this situation falls (a) the case when we have several copies of an unknown
state (or generally classically correlated input and thus we can make a quantum state estimation) or (b) the case
when we have one copy of an arbitrary mixed state Ξ =
∑
piΞi with given a priori probabilities pi and we implement
one of possible discrimination techniques such as unambiguous state discrimination (if applicable), minimum error
discrimination or their advanced combinations [18]. On the contrary, if one has one copy of an unknown or even
known state then the encryption is unnecessary. In the first case the state is already encrypted (an unknown qubit is
seen as a mixture of all states in the Bloch Sphere that is proportional to a maximally mixed state) and in the latter
case one just needs to send classical information about the state preparation and a high-priced quantum channel is not
4required for the state transmission (the question of information load tradeoff between classical and quantum channel
is not interesting for us now).
For later purposes, let us shortly discuss how the leakage of information of an encrypted state can be measured. The
extractable information is quantified by the accessible information which is a maximization over all possible POVMs.
However, finding the optimal POVM is a rather difficult task and analytical solutions are known only for few cases,
mostly under some kind of symmetry [10]. In this light, the quantity we will use is the Holevo information [11]
χ({pi, ̺i}) = S(̺)−
n∑
i=1
piS(̺i) (8)
bounding the accessible information from above, where ̺ =
∑
pi̺i and S(̺) = −Tr [̺ log2 ̺] is the von Neumann
entropy. The Holevo bound is more feasible to calculate than the accessible information but it is not generally a tight
bound. Fortunately, in the case we are investigating it is so. To see it, let us assume that an input qubit is fully
encrypted
Ξ =
n∑
i=1
piΞi
PQC
7−→
n∑
i=1
pi
1
4
4∑
j
σjΞiσ
†
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
̺i ∝1
= ̺ (∝ 1 ). (9)
Then, for the best possible discrimination of the states before encryption (Ξi) Eve has to distinguish among ̺i because
the non-encrypted states were transformed onto this ’encoding’. Inserting the encoding into (8) we get χ({pi, ̺i}) = 0.
Of course, after the encryption Eve may attempt to distinguish any encoding at her will (and the Holevo bound does
not need to be zero) but whatever discrimination strategy she chooses at the end of the day she always gets zero
information about the occurrence of the states Ξi before the encryption [8].
III. INFORMATION GAIN OF AN ACCELERATED EAVESDROPPER
The purpose of this main part is to show that in the limit of infinite acceleration an eavesdropper (Eve as the
Rindler observer) cannot get any information from just a partially encrypted qubit. First, we show that in the infinite
limit the Holevo bound for a perfectly encrypted qubit is the same as a partially encrypted one. Second, despite the
Holevo bound not being a tight upper bound for the accessible information we show that the accessible information
available to the accelerated eavesdropper tapping a partially encrypted qubit is zero as well. We may write
|χ({pi, ̺i})− χ({p˜i, ˜̺i})| =
∣∣∣∣∣S(̺)− S(˜̺) +
n∑
i=1
p˜iS(˜̺i)−
n∑
i=1
piS(̺i)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |S(˜̺)− S(̺)|+
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
p˜iS(˜̺i)−
n∑
i=1
piS(̺i)
∣∣∣∣∣ by the triangle inequality. (10)
Next, in the spirit of Eq. (9) we use S(̺i) = S(̺) and prove the convergence of the second summand in the second
row of Eq. (10). Later, using the same equality, we show that the convergence of the first summand follows from a
simple modification of the proof of the convergence of the second summand. It is a special case simply by putting
n = 1 (p˜i = 1), i.e. omitting the sum over n in all the derivations which follow.
Hence, rewriting the second summand in Eq. (10) and generating its Taylor series about any (identical) nonzero
point we get after the rearranging [20]
∞∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
p˜iλ˜ij log2 λ˜ij − λj log2 λj
)
=
∞∑
j=1
(
∞∑
k=0
(
bk
n∑
i=1
p˜iλ˜
k
ij − λ
k
j
))
=
∞∑
k=0
(
bk
n∑
i=1
p˜iTr
[
˜̺ki
]
− Tr
[
̺k
])
, (11)
where λ˜ij , λj is the j−th eigenvalue of ˜̺i and ̺, respectively, and
∑∞
j=1 λ˜
k
ij = Tr
[
˜̺ki
]
,
∑∞
j=1 λ
k
j = Tr
[
̺k
]
was used.
bk are the Taylor expansion coefficients and are set up to be identical for all expanded functions in our case [20].
Eq. (11) is trivially equal to zero if k = 0, the same holds for k = 1 (˜̺i, ̺ are density matrices and
∑
p˜i = 1). For
5k = 2 we will show its asymptotic convergence to zero in Rindler space by a direct calculation. This will be a starting
point for proving the convergence for k > 2. First, we set up the following notation
aq =
tanh2q r
cosh4 r
(1 + q) Aq =
tanh2q r
cosh3 r
√
1 + q (12)
(r ∈ R+) where aq are the elements of Eq. (4) forming the diagonal of Eqs. (6) and (7) in Rindler spacetime. Similarly,
the coefficients Aq coming from Eq. (5) are the off-diagonal elements of Eq. (7) in Rindler spacetime. The off-diagonal
coefficients of the matrices ˜̺i (coming from Eq. (7) for Ξ =
∑
piΞi) are the scalar functions fi(Ξ12,Ξ21) independent
of the acceleration and do not transform. Also, note that we work just with one mode k, l [21]. Next, for the upcoming
considerations we need to know that aq > aq+1, limr→∞
∑∞
q=0 a
2
q = 0, 0 ≤ aq ≤ 1 and the same holds for Aq. Writing
the square of ˜̺i we get a five-diagonal infinite-dimensional matrix where on the diagonals we generally find sequences
of the type
∑
aqap,
∑
AqAp and
∑
aqAp [22]. Due to the properties of aq, Aq all of them can be bounded from above
by putting p = q thus the sequences (and of course their elements) converge to zero for r →∞.
To continue let us consider the following inequalities
n∑
i=1
p˜i Tr
[
˜̺ki
]
− Tr
[
̺k
]
≤
n∑
i=1
Tr
[
˜̺ki
]
− Tr
[
̺k
]
≤ Tr

( n∑
i=1
˜̺i + ̺
)k ≤ Tr [(n+ 1)k ˜̺kmax] , (13)
where, as stated, all ˜̺i have the same form as Eq. (7) but with different scalar functions fi(Ξ12,Ξ21). Thus, the
maximum is taken over n scalar functions. The last inequality in Eq. (13) does not hold in general but the structure
of ˜̺i, ̺ allows us to do it (recall that we are in Rindler spacetime where ̺ is a diagonal density matrix and ˜̺i are
three-diagonal density matrices with the main diagonal equal to the diagonal of ̺). Then
lim
r→∞
(
n∑
i=1
Tr
[
˜̺ki
]
− Tr
[
̺k
])
≤ lim
r→∞
Tr
[(
m ˜̺2max
)k/2]
= mTr
[(
lim
r→∞
˜̺2max
)k′]
, (14)
where m = (n + 1)2, k′ = k/2 (note that for the convergence of the first summand in Eq. (10) we have m = 1 and
thus there is no need for the maximization over n). We use some basic limit properties in the last equality with
limr→∞ ˜̺
2
max meaning the limit of every element of the matrix ˜̺
2
max. Since for r →∞ the limit converges to zero its
k′−th matrix power converge as well thus proving the convergence of Eq. (11) to zero. Consequently, we bounded the
Holevo information difference (10) from above.
Since the Holevo bound is not a tight bound on the accessible information it remains one step more and we follow
up with the discussion from the end of Sec. II. From Eq. (10) we know that the difference goes asymptotically to zero.
Now we choose the encoding {pi, ̺i} of the perfect PQC such that χ({pi, ̺i}) = 0 both in Minkowski and Rindler
spacetime. In fact it corresponds to Eve’s choice of the discrimination strategy in Rindler spacetime. Although we
cannot dictate Eve what to do, in this case, due to the properties of perfect PQC, any tapping strategy she is able
to do gives her no information. Then, from the convergence above together with Eq. (10) it follows that the Rindler
observer (Eve) cannot get any information even from the partially encrypted quantum state.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Wa addressed the question of the role of the Unruh effect on security of quantum communication. We considered the
setting where two honest parties are at rest (Minkowski observers) and an eavesdropper is uniformly accelerated with
respect to them (Rindler observer). The Minkowski observers established PQC where logical qubits are represented
by a free scalar field in the form of so-called Minkowski particles considering the dual-rail encoding. The legal parties
did not satisfy the security requirements and they encrypted a qubit with just one bit of a classical key instead of two
bits. Since this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the perfect encryption, it would generally lead to a leakage
of some information about the qubit. However, we have shown that in the limit of infinite acceleration this partial
encryption is sufficient to secure the qubit and, thus, it is prevented form getting any information into the hands of
an eavesdropper.
In other words, we have shown that the Unruh effect makes the communication noisy in the direction where the
eavesdropper in an non-inertial frame cannot distinguish between a perfectly and partially encrypted qubit. The
important aspect of the above conclusion is that we did not consider problematic single photon excitations (Fock
states) but temporarily and spatially localized objects both in Minkowski and Rindler spacetime (Minkowski and
Rindler particles, respectively). The problem of Fock states lies in their delocalization making difficult to talk about
6the preparation or manipulation (considering the production of Fock states in a realistic cavity which is subsequently
accelerated brings even more problems). This is the first step toward the description of a more natural and general
setup where both the legal participants and Eve are differently accelerated and the objective would be to enumerate
the leaked information not only in the asymptotic case.
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